Why controls are a target
Twenty years ago, a BAS or PLC sat on its own wiring and only a technician with a laptop on site could touch it. Today the same systems are on Ethernet, connected to the office network, reachable from a phone, and often installed by contractors who set up remote access and moved on.
That convenience has a cost. Building and plant controls, often called operational technology (OT), can be found and attacked like any other connected device. The consequences are physical: heating that stops in January, pumps that stop, alarms that do not reach anyone, or equipment run in ways that damage it.
The good news is that most incidents exploit simple weaknesses, and most of the fixes are simple too.
Security is also about reliability. The same habits that keep attackers out, such as knowing what is on the network, keeping backups and controlling who can change things, also protect you from honest mistakes, failed hardware and the contractor who changed a setpoint and forgot to mention it.
Know what you have
You cannot protect devices you do not know about. Build a basic inventory:
- Every controller, HMI, gateway and server, with model and firmware version
- How each one is connected: to which network, through which switch
- Every form of remote access, including cellular modems a vendor installed years ago
- Who has accounts, and who knows the passwords
This is often where surprises turn up: an old dial-up or cellular modem still live in a panel, a camera system on the same network as the BAS, or a remote access tool nobody remembers approving.
Separate the networks
Segmentation means putting controls on their own network, separated from office computers, guest Wi-Fi and cameras by a firewall that allows only the traffic that is actually needed. If a laptop on the office side is infected, it cannot reach the boiler controller.
This is usually done with the IT team or provider, using managed switches and firewall rules. The structured cabling and network gear can often stay; the change is mostly in how the network is configured.
Control remote access
- Never expose a controller or HMI directly to the internet. Use a VPN or secure remote access gateway.
- Turn on multi-factor authentication wherever the remote access tool supports it.
- Give each person their own account. Shared logins make it impossible to know who did what.
- Enable vendor access only when needed, and turn it off afterward.
- Keep a log of remote sessions, and review it now and then.
Basic hygiene that goes a long way
| Step | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| Change default passwords on every device | Default credentials are published and are the first thing attackers try |
| Remove accounts for former staff and contractors | Old accounts are a common way in |
| Keep backups of programs and configurations offline | Lets you recover from a failure or attack, not just a cyber incident |
| Apply firmware and software updates on a plan | Fixes known weaknesses, but test first on critical systems |
| Retire unsupported operating systems on HMIs | Old Windows versions no longer receive security fixes |
| Write down who to call and what to do | An incident at 2 a.m. is not the time to look for phone numbers |
Unlike office PCs, control systems should not be patched automatically. An update that reboots a controller or breaks compatibility can stop equipment. Plan updates with your controls provider and test them where possible.
Standards and next steps
For larger facilities, the ISA/IEC 62443 series of standards provides a framework for securing industrial automation and control systems, and many organizations use it to set requirements for vendors. Smaller buildings can get most of the benefit from the steps above.
Build security into new projects from the start: require owner-held credentials, documented network design and secure remote access in every controls contract. See PLC basics for owners and SCADA and remote monitoring for remote sites for related guidance.
Our BAS installation, SCADA and remote monitoring and controls migration teams design systems with segmentation and secure remote access in mind, and can work alongside your IT provider.
Common questions
We are a small building. Is anyone really going to attack our BAS?
Most attacks are not targeted. Automated scans look for any exposed device with known weaknesses or default passwords. Small buildings are affected precisely because they are often left unprotected.
Should our IT department manage the controls network?
IT and controls people should work together. IT brings network and security skills; controls people know what the equipment needs to keep running safely. Neither should change the other's systems without coordination.
Is cloud-connected building automation less secure?
Not necessarily. A well-run cloud service can be more secure than a forgotten on-site server. Ask how the connection is secured, who can access it, and what happens if the service is unavailable.
What should we do if we think a controller was tampered with?
Put affected equipment in a safe state, disconnect remote access, preserve logs if you can, and call your controls provider and IT support. Restore from a known good backup once the cause is understood.
Codes and permit rules change and every building is different. For work on your system, talk to a licensed electrician and your local permit authority.