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Instrumentation, controls and automation

Cybersecurity basics for building and plant controls

Building automation systems, PLCs and SCADA are now networked, which makes them targets. Here are the practical steps owners can take without becoming security experts.

7 min readFor facility managers2 illustrations

Why controls are a target

Twenty years ago, a BAS or PLC sat on its own wiring and only a technician with a laptop on site could touch it. Today the same systems are on Ethernet, connected to the office network, reachable from a phone, and often installed by contractors who set up remote access and moved on.

That convenience has a cost. Building and plant controls, often called operational technology (OT), can be found and attacked like any other connected device. The consequences are physical: heating that stops in January, pumps that stop, alarms that do not reach anyone, or equipment run in ways that damage it.

The good news is that most incidents exploit simple weaknesses, and most of the fixes are simple too.

Security is also about reliability. The same habits that keep attackers out, such as knowing what is on the network, keeping backups and controlling who can change things, also protect you from honest mistakes, failed hardware and the contractor who changed a setpoint and forgot to mention it.

Know what you have

You cannot protect devices you do not know about. Build a basic inventory:

  • Every controller, HMI, gateway and server, with model and firmware version
  • How each one is connected: to which network, through which switch
  • Every form of remote access, including cellular modems a vendor installed years ago
  • Who has accounts, and who knows the passwords

This is often where surprises turn up: an old dial-up or cellular modem still live in a panel, a camera system on the same network as the BAS, or a remote access tool nobody remembers approving.

Separate the networks

FIG 01Alberta Electrical
Two network drawings: a flat network where office PCs, cameras and controllers all connect, and a segmented one where controls sit behind a firewall. FLAT NETWORK VS SEGMENTED NETWORK BEFORE: EVERYTHING ON ONE NETWORK PC CAM WIFI BAS PLC NET ONE INFECTED LAPTOP REACHES ALL AFTER: CONTROLS IN THEIR OWN ZONE OFFICE / IT FIREWALL CONTROLS / OT ONLY APPROVED TRAFFIC CROSSES
Separating building and plant controls from office and guest networks, with a firewall allowing only approved traffic, limits how far a problem can spread.

Segmentation means putting controls on their own network, separated from office computers, guest Wi-Fi and cameras by a firewall that allows only the traffic that is actually needed. If a laptop on the office side is infected, it cannot reach the boiler controller.

This is usually done with the IT team or provider, using managed switches and firewall rules. The structured cabling and network gear can often stay; the change is mostly in how the network is configured.

Control remote access

FIG 02Alberta Electrical
Diagram of a vendor connecting through a VPN gateway with multi-factor authentication and a logged jump host to reach the BAS and PLC. SAFER REMOTE ACCESS FOR VENDORS AND STAFF VENDOR ORON-CALL TECH VPN OR SECUREGATEWAY+ MFA JUMP HOST(LOGGED) BAS PLC AVOID: CONTROLLER OR HMI OPEN DIRECTLY TO THE INTERNET AVOID: SHARED LOGINS, ALWAYS-ON VENDOR CONNECTIONS EACH PERSON HAS THEIR OWN ACCOUNT. ACCESS CAN BE TURNED OFF WHEN THE JOB IS DONE, AND EVERY SESSION IS RECORDED.
A safer remote access path: individual accounts with multi-factor sign-in through a secure gateway and a logged jump host, instead of controllers exposed directly to the internet.
  • Never expose a controller or HMI directly to the internet. Use a VPN or secure remote access gateway.
  • Turn on multi-factor authentication wherever the remote access tool supports it.
  • Give each person their own account. Shared logins make it impossible to know who did what.
  • Enable vendor access only when needed, and turn it off afterward.
  • Keep a log of remote sessions, and review it now and then.

Basic hygiene that goes a long way

StepWhy it matters
Change default passwords on every deviceDefault credentials are published and are the first thing attackers try
Remove accounts for former staff and contractorsOld accounts are a common way in
Keep backups of programs and configurations offlineLets you recover from a failure or attack, not just a cyber incident
Apply firmware and software updates on a planFixes known weaknesses, but test first on critical systems
Retire unsupported operating systems on HMIsOld Windows versions no longer receive security fixes
Write down who to call and what to doAn incident at 2 a.m. is not the time to look for phone numbers
SafetyUpdate with care

Unlike office PCs, control systems should not be patched automatically. An update that reboots a controller or breaks compatibility can stop equipment. Plan updates with your controls provider and test them where possible.

Standards and next steps

For larger facilities, the ISA/IEC 62443 series of standards provides a framework for securing industrial automation and control systems, and many organizations use it to set requirements for vendors. Smaller buildings can get most of the benefit from the steps above.

Build security into new projects from the start: require owner-held credentials, documented network design and secure remote access in every controls contract. See PLC basics for owners and SCADA and remote monitoring for remote sites for related guidance.

Our BAS installation, SCADA and remote monitoring and controls migration teams design systems with segmentation and secure remote access in mind, and can work alongside your IT provider.

Common questions

We are a small building. Is anyone really going to attack our BAS?

Most attacks are not targeted. Automated scans look for any exposed device with known weaknesses or default passwords. Small buildings are affected precisely because they are often left unprotected.

Should our IT department manage the controls network?

IT and controls people should work together. IT brings network and security skills; controls people know what the equipment needs to keep running safely. Neither should change the other's systems without coordination.

Is cloud-connected building automation less secure?

Not necessarily. A well-run cloud service can be more secure than a forgotten on-site server. Ask how the connection is secured, who can access it, and what happens if the service is unavailable.

What should we do if we think a controller was tampered with?

Put affected equipment in a safe state, disconnect remote access, preserve logs if you can, and call your controls provider and IT support. Restore from a known good backup once the cause is understood.

About this guideGeneral information, not a site assessment

Codes and permit rules change and every building is different. For work on your system, talk to a licensed electrician and your local permit authority.

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